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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite considerable research into developing effective systems for achieving disaster 
resilience after a major disaster (Blakely, Birch & Anglin, 2011; Vale & Campanella, 2005), 
there is an ongoing gap between the purpose of long-term disaster recovery and actual 
implementation. We will suggest that this is because, unusually, the nature of the disaster 
recovery process changes over time. It develops from being a complicated set of interrelated, 
urgent but essentially predictable problems in the short-term response phase, into a complex 
systems problem. In this paper we will first show that the disaster literature assumes a linear 
progression from short-term to long-term recovery as part of a well-document disaster life 
cycle. Second, we suggest that this is based on a set of assumptions about the disaster 
recovery process which are potentially both limiting the possibilities of building a disaster 
resilient community and explaining current problems being experienced by those involved in 
disaster recovery worldwide. We then use data from Japan and Christchurch to offer evidence 
of the need to change some of the elements of the long-term recovery model. 
 
DISASTER RECOVERY AS A COMPLEX PROBLEM 
 
Theoretical and practical approaches to disaster recovery have been developed to 
ameliorate immediate response, longer term recovery and potential prevention. Disaster 
literature in the sciences focuses on the uses of science to either prevent disaster or inform 
policy-based responses post disaster; however effective communications between the 
scientific community and policy-makers are missing, as discussed in the recent UN World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Walch, 2015). In the social science fields, 
theoretical and practical approaches have been developed to support longer-term policy 
towards disaster resilience, which is about the two extremes: bouncing back from stress and 
being able to adapt (Fisher, 2015; Manyena, 2006). One such approach, disaster life-cycle 
models, reflects agreement in current theory that a disaster triggers a crisis response cycle 
(Ritchie, 2004).  
The cycle, usually portrayed as a linear model, commences with rebuilding, 
redeveloping and renewal to support effective recovery (Blakely, 2012); it ends when the 
residents or users of an affected area resume their normal lives and mechanisms have been 
established to lessen the effect of future similar disasters (Muskat et al., 2014). The majority 
of the existing disaster recovery literature focuses on the short-term phases and technical 
responses (Muskat et al., 2015; Nakanishi, Matsuo & Black, 2014; Vale & Campanella, 
2005). It is assumed that there will be movement from one part of the cycle to the next but, in 
fact, the move to long-term disaster recovery has proved to be less than automatic (Muskat et 
  
 
al., 2014). It is logical that the different phases need dissimilar approaches and strategies for 
resilience development. However, it emerges that little is understood about what triggers 
those involved in a specific disaster context to ‘transition’ into new approaches that should 
lead to long-term recovery and resilience strategies. Recently the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) suggested a need ‘to facilitate the link between relief, 
rehabilitation and development’ in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2030 because there was not the seamless expected progression; however, a detailed 
description of the link is yet to be provided (UNISDR, 2015).   
There is no agreed set of disaster terminology across the literature but a review 
reveals that there are distinct stages in the literature (Henderson, 2004; Vale & Campanella, 
2005). In this paper we use Relief for the immediate phase after the disaster, Rehabilitation 
for the temporary settlement phase and Recovery for the long-term phase. What is apparent is 
that there is clear differentiation between the short-term and the long-term recovery phases, 
with very different activities being undertaken.  
Recent challenges to assumed linearity suggest that the move from short-term rescue 
and relief to longer-term recovery and resilience development is not inevitable; instead 
Muskat et al. (2015) propose a ‘transition’ period between the short-term and long-term 
phases of recovery, arguing that the nature of the problem changes over time. Initially, 
regardless of the context, there will be a complicated set of problems related to survival, 
infrastructure, health etc., which can be solved with relatively routine solutions. A 
complicated system can be understood through its structural decomposition – that is, through 
the segmentation of the whole system into disjoined structural parts and their relations, and 
the further subdivision of these parts into smaller subparts and their relations; there are many 
positions, routines and processes that can be recognised and reconfigured without actually 
changing their nature. A common example is sending a rocket to the moon. Plans, process, 
formulae or recipes are critical and necessary to solve a complicated problem but they will 
need to be applied by people with high levels of expertise in a variety of fields. Learning 
from one event can be applied to the next event as the nature of the element does not change; 
thus sending one rocket increases assurance that the next mission will be a success. In some 
critical ways, rockets are similar to each other and because of this there can be a relatively 
high degree of certainty of outcome (Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002). The key is that 
“complicated problems originate from causes that can be individually distinguished; they 
can be addressed piece-by-piece; for each input to the system there is a proportionate output; 
the relevant systems can be controlled and the problems they present admit permanent 
solutions” (Poli, 2013: 142). This clearly fits the initial stages of a disaster. The exact nature 
of the disaster will differ but the need to rescue, feed, shelter, communicate etc. is well 
understood and becomes a series of complicated routines applied by excellent crisis leaders 
(Sapriel, 2003; ‘t Hart, Tindall & Brown, 2009).  However, we suggest that once such 
technical solutions have been implemented, the problem changes, to become a complex set of 
policy related problems that will need very different approaches in both design and adoption.  
We suggest that adopting linear conceptions of disaster recovery might actually inhibit, rather 
than effectively support, long-term, disaster recovery.  
A complex problem results from networks of multiple interacting causes that cannot 
be individually distinguished and to do so is often to lose or change the understanding that 
was in place (Poli, 2013). A complex problem cannot be addressed in a piecemeal way, it 
must be addressed as an entire system. Small inputs may result in disproportionate effects; 
the problems they present cannot be solved once and forever, but require to be systematically 
managed and typically any intervention merges into new problems as a result of the 
interventions dealing with them; and the relevant systems cannot be controlled – the best one 
can do is to influence them. Complex problems occur within a system, which is made up of 
  
 
interconnected, interdependent elements that work together in a nonlinear manner and 
produce feedback loops (Anderson 1999; Van Beurden, Kia, Zask, Dietrich & Rose, 2011; 
Simon 1996; Boal & Schultz 2007). This sounds like long-term recovery where the nature 
and extent of the problem differs for each disaster as a whole and for each stakeholder 
affected by it; there are many, potentially conflicting goals and objectives. Moreover, each 
disaster response often leads to unexpected consequences. In each case, however, the 
problem is still complex. This leads to the proposition that a key reason for ongoing failure to 
develop effective long-term recovery processes is the need to recognise this unusual situation 
where a problem changes from complicated to complex over time and that there will need to 
be a specific transition from the short-term phase to the long-term phase rather than an 
automatic progression. 
We are not the only people to suggest that a long-term approach necessitates a 
different methodology from traditional policies and is not, therefore, facilitated by current 
disaster risk management practices (Comfort et al., 2004; Kemp, Loorbach & Rotmans, 
2007), but the framing of the problem as a move from one form of problem to another is new. 
The proposition for this paper emerged from careful analysis of case studies developed in 
both Japan and New Zealand. It was apparent that, in both cases, the move to effective longer 
term recovery was proving challenging and so we re-analysed the data asking the question:  
“what aspects of the interactions between the different recovery stakeholders explain why the 
transition to long-term disaster recovery is slow”.  We will present evidence that there were 
concerns with the progress of the recovery and offer confirmation that the re-development 
and growth transition will not be automatic. Further we identify some areas and ideas and, for 
success: both the processes and the people involved will need to be actively managed. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper is based on learnings developed from building two sets of case data. In each 
case the studies were exploratory study designed to gain some insights into different aspects of 
disaster, in particular the recovery stage. The first research case was the magnitude 6.3 (ML) 
Christchurch Earthquake which occurred on Tuesday, 22 February 2011, severely damaging 
New Zealand's second-largest city and killing 185 people.  The earthquake caused widespread 
damage across Christchurch, with significant liquefaction producing around 400,000 tonnes of 
silt. The second case was the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami when a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake hit Japan on 11th March 2011. An area of more than 507 square kilometres was 
inundated with a total death toll of 15,890 (2,589 still missing as of March 2015). The case 
concentrated on one of the most devastated areas Miyagi prefecture, including Ishinomaki, 
Kesennuma, Minamisanriku and the prefecture capital of Sendai and Tokyo.  
In both cases the original research timing was designed reflecting the Crisis Recovery 
Cycle; it was anticipated that the initial relief and rehabilitation phases were over after 18 
months to 24 months. In each case the exploratory nature of the research which was seeking in 
depth understandings of a particular phenomenon (Goulding, 2005; Yin, 2014; Stake, 2006), 
combined with the relatively small research population size, a qualitative interviewing 
approach was adopted (Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera & McGregor, 2010; Creswell, 2014; 
Patton, 1990). A purposive and snowball sampling frame was adopted. Interviewees were 
recruited from related authorities in recovery, urban planners, small business, volunteer 
organisation and residents.  55 participants were interviewed on a range of topics related to 
longer term disaster recovery. 
The first analysis of each case was done using open coding (Silverman, 2013) in order 
to look at all the issues raised for each phase of the disaster recovery in terms of the roles of 
  
 
both volunteers and other stakeholders affected by the disaster. Each transcript was read several 
times to develop an understanding of the range of realities related to the phenomena. We then 
used phases of recovery as the analytical lens to group the ideas that emerged during the open 
coding. Groups of codes were clustered temporally (i.e. in phases), thematically in terms of the 
topics (i.e. governance, recovery, community, policy development etc.), and around 
stakeholder groups (i.e. volunteers, government etc.). This led to axial coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 2008) looking for the connections between category groups. Of particular interest were 
areas of commonalities and differences with other participants, accepted literature or the 
official documentation. 
The secondary analysis for this paper was undertaken in order to consider what was in 
the transition stage. Core themes suggested as barriers to transitioning to effective long-term 
recovery were identified from both cases. Three areas stood out as having the greatest potential 
impact: the inclusion of new actors; the development of new social capital, and the use of co-
production with the local community. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
New and Developing Actors    
Initially in Japan four traditional groups of actors took leading roles in the disaster 
recovery: Government (including national Government, regional government (Miyagi 
prefecture) and local councils), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) (international and 
national volunteer organisations, e.g. Peaceboat), residents and local businesses. Predictably, 
they were formally assigned to undertake immediate rescue and relief. As time progressed 
from relief to rehabilitation, new local groups developed working with community, often led 
by local leaders. Rehabilitation began to move towards recovery; at this stage the influence of 
governmental groups declined; volunteer groups gained more influence; and new leadership 
groups and collectives were formed. Residents and business owners agreed that the new 
volunteer groups were perceived as demonstrating high initiative, forming groups through 
organizing, initiating collaborative events and developing ‘ideas from the outside’ to refresh 
thinking on how the community could be rebuilt.  In addition, strong, cohesive groups of 
residents formed new collectives, which initiated activities to bring individuals out of 
lethargy, depression and isolation. Whilst recognizing the important governmental role in the 
industrial and infrastructure renewal, the government was seen as failing in its service the 
community; specifically there was little collaboration with both resident groups and 
volunteers and strong critique. A new leadership group emerged with social entrepreneurs 
contributing to the social and individual development of the region, investing in small 
business ideas and supporting community growth. These businesses include local food 
restaurants, homestays in fishing villages and a story teller taxi service.  
In Christchurch a similar pattern emerged with Government (including national 
Government, and local councils), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) (international and 
national volunteer organisations), the Defence Force, residents and local businesses all 
involved. However, there was concern that as time had moved on, those involved had not and 
that recovery had continued to be top-down, strongly centralised and not reflective of wider 
community opinions. 
Theory about solving complex problems shows that how individuals behave and 
interact has a direct impact on whether policy interventions are successful (Head, 2008). Thus 
a lack of community involvement and agency may explain the lack of effective long-term 
disaster recovery because, although new infrastructure may be built, the necessary 
behavioural changes to support disaster preparedness will be less likely to develop.  
 
  
 
Social Capital    
The critical importance of social capital in assisting disaster recovery is widely 
recognised in the literature (Allen, 2011; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Dynes, 2005; 
Hawkins & Maurer, 2010; Murphy, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004), but less is understood 
about how these various types of social capital contribute to (or hinder) long-term recovery 
(Aldrich, 2012a; Nakanishi et al., 2014). In Japan after the 2011 disaster, pre-existing 
community was completely dispersed due to loss of lives, limitation of available and safe 
land to construct temporary housing and the system that was applied to allocate temporary 
housing units to residents. However, a new social network emerged among residents through 
activities (such as morning tea and exercise) in the common space of temporary housing and 
events driven by volunteer groups. This has enabled the creation of new social capital which 
might be able to support recovery. This could be evidence that disasters may motivate 
previously unconnected individuals to undertake collective action creating endogenous social 
capital, both bridged, bonded and linking, where there was none before. However this is still 
a challenge where appropriate leadership, ownership, participation and information sharing 
need to be in place in a proper organisation (Ueda and Shaw, 2016).  In terms of the 
developing roles of volunteers their role as actors can be seen to integrate the long-term 
disaster system, supporting the development of new bridging capital. Once the social capital 
is growing it leads to the community seeking more involvement. In Christchurch, in 
particular this was leading to calls for greater levels of inclusion in the decision making 
processes.  
The challenge in the complex long-term recovery, in terms of social capital, is that the 
newly formed social capital might be affected; for example by relocating residents to 
new/repaired houses or if residents need to move outside of the disaster area (for employment 
and study etc.) after a certain period of time after disaster. This, in turn affects the recovery of 
society no matter how the physical infrastructure is rebuilt.  
 
Co-production  
In the immediate post-disaster phase, the majority of aid provides emergency goods 
and materials to repair houses and restore essential infrastructure; consequently, a centralised 
top-down form of crisis leadership is appropriate. However, recent research indicates that, 
over time, the leaders of the recovery and local community members can become 
disconnected, such that the community feel ignored (Muskat et al., 2015). When governments 
and leaders continue to steer recovery in a centralised top down manner, it does not reflect 
how the community expects to be treated in the later stages of the disaster recovery. Both the 
Japanese and Christchurch case data demonstrated that community members were becoming 
key resources in the recovery process, sometimes taking leadership. Co-production is where 
value is co-created by two or more stakeholders to ensure the appropriateness and usefulness 
of knowledge, processes or outcomes created (Alford & O’Flynn, 2012) and analysis of both 
cases showed calls for more inclusion in the form of co-production of both recovery policy 
and implementation.   
The co-production concept developed out of situations where both the consumers and 
the providers of a service undertook efforts to produce the good or service together in a way 
that would improve the quality and increase the likelihood of effective outcomes (Humphreys 
and Grayson, 2008; Parks et al., 1981). This matters because during post-disaster recovery, 
personal values and motivation play important roles in framing how citizens respond to the 
decisions being made by the governments and other stakeholders who are designing the blue 
prints for the future (LaLone, 2012; Shannon et al., 2014). If there is not an appropriate level 
of co-production and there is less traction with the community, the case data showed 
increasing tensions between the different stakeholders and less effective long-term recovery.  
  
 
An example is the failure of the Japanese seawall project (Kesennuma city seawall 
study group, 2012). The seawall project proposed by the local government (under the 
guidelines of the national government) caused a controversy not only because of the idea to 
build a seawall of 5.0m to 14.7m in height along the coastline that needs to be maintained for 
at least 50 years but also, and mainly, because of the entirely top-down process. The general 
view of the community was that the prefecture should have involved residents from the very 
beginning of the planning process, before they created the plan. As a result of the conflict, the 
residents established a “seawall study group” and organised sessions with invited lecturers, 
including the prefecture officer, city council, mayor, an assembly member and academics 
from various fields so that they can examine the plan. The residents group suggested 
alternatives and these were shared with the government to amend the plan. This corroborates 
that co-production is important to gain community buy-in, harness innovation ideas within 
the community, and to increase the capacity of post-disaster recovery and associated 
enhanced preparedness for next disasters. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
From our analysis it appears that we can identify some elements required for transition. 
All three elements identified in the data as affecting the potential for transition are based around 
system actors. It is also clear that the results of the different interactions of system elements 
will lead to emergent, often unexpected results (Gharajedaghi, 2006; Leveson, 2011). This 
makes it unlikely, for example, that having the same recovery plan in place five years on will 
be effective as the context, the actors and the purpose will have moved on. With the complex 
nature of the disaster recovery it seems more realistic that the initially adopted plan becomes 
no longer rational in 2-3 years period (as evidenced in Japan and New Zealand), and the 
integration of co-production is rather organic in designing recovery as it will, therefore, bring 
the agreed and valuable outcome. We propose that the transition that involves this process 
would be essential for sustainable disaster recovery and needs further research as it is currently 
missing in disaster research. 
This paper proposes a period of ‘transition’ that facilitates the progress towards long-
term recovery which needs to be set up and managed in a different way to the immediate 
responses. No community can be sustainable without achieving a recovery once it is affected 
by a disaster. Short-term responses such as rescue, relief and reconstruction of affected built 
environment enable the return to a normal life. However, there is a limitation for 
communities to be stronger to future disasters if the process of recovery stops at the 
completion of rehabilitation. For communities to enhance the preparedness to the future 
disasters, there is a need for an integrated approach – long-term recovery that is linked with 
sustainable development.  
Long-term disaster recovery is a different problem to short-term response being a 
complex system which needs the actors within it to work together to achieve the espoused 
goals. This is the reason that ‘transition’ needs to be recognised for a successful recovery and, 
once recognised as an issue, analysed in terms of what it is made up. We do not claim that the 
elements are the only aspects of transition, or even the most important, but from our data we 
do suggest that they are a good place to start in terms of undertaking more research into this 
area. 
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